As I have alluded to in previous articles, the Covid-19 pandemic has been an incredible and very real case study in Health and Safety, with all New Zealand as the site and all New Zealanders as the participants. The re-emergence of community transmission in Auckland provides another context in which we can examine health and safety policies, procedures, and theory, and then look at how to apply the lessons to our own health and safety journey.
This latest chapter provides a very clear lens on the idea of prevention of an incident versus control of an incident. Do accidents occur because we fail to prevent an event, or because we fail to control an event. In the case of the Covid-19 re-emergence, was too much emphasis placed on trying to prevent a community outbreak rather than controlling the inevitable once it happened. The very detrimental effects of the new lockdown on our economic and social wellbeing begs the question that possibly the balance was not quite right.
After the incidents of infected people travelling through the country and the breakouts from managed isolation facilities, the emphasis was firmly on preventing the virus from getting back into the community. This was most noticeable by increased security at isolation facilities, more boots on the ground, and a change in leadership at the top. However, all these measures failed to prevent the re-emergence of community transmission.
Instead, should our focus have been more on the other side of the coin. Realising that sooner or later the virus will jump from inside the facilities to outside the facilities, and then we consider what this might look like. The most obvious conclusion is that for this to occur, the only way is through an infected person passing on the virus to a worker at the border or at an isolation facility. This immediately makes regular testing of all these potential carriers the highest priority. The fact that this was not done until after the outbreak may highlight a failure in control.
The second conclusion is around contact tracing. The sooner we can connect the dots of close contacts, the sooner any outbreak can be effectively contained. The fact that the Auckland cluster is now the largest we have seen, and has resulted in a 2-week lockdown, raises a few questions about the effectiveness of the government’s Covid tracing App. The App requires a smart phone, which many people may not own, and relies on voluntary compliance of people getting the app and then using it. Does this ring any bells about people choosing to not follow a procedure because they judge the risk as acceptable? Where do facemasks sit in the grand scheme of control, compliance, effectiveness, and regulation?
The proposed Covid card provides an interesting alternative. This card could be issued to all New Zealanders and simply tracks all other cards it comes in close contact with. This is a technologically savvy control, with much less voluntary compliance requirements. The downside is the cost, $20 per card, which comes in at a cool $100 million. However, one figure I saw stated that the lockdown “cost” to the Auckland economy is $500 million per week. The joker in the deck is the possibility of a vaccine, which would make this investment redundant. Once again this is familiar health and safety territory, in which the cost to benefit ratio raises its head.
In conclusion, is prevention more important than control, or vice versa? And in the end does it all boil down to economics?
Paul Duggan
General Manager
paulduggan@safetycharter.org.nz
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